Sunday, 30 December 2012

Re-visiting Ravaisson with Aquinas

In Of Habit, Ravaisson argues that habit is an ontological force that affects and constitutes the very being of the individual. It holds a plasticity, in Malabou's sense of the term of being both a cause and result of change. Habit becomes self-sculpting for the individual through a  process of trans-differentiation with a form of plasticity that stands between the before and after, between the actual and the possible. In speaking for Ravaisson, the plasticity that forms the base of habit 'is the uninterrupted current of involuntary spontaneity, flowing noiselessly in the depths of the soul, that the will draws limits and determines forms', and 'Being infinitely divisible the milieu can never be exhausted, and consequently we can never penetrate it.' (pg. 75).
Habit for Ravaisson is an acquired nature, a second nature. With its element of plasticity it is a flux, a movement, a middle term that demonstrates the tie and convergence of will and nature, or man and his primordial and basic origin. In a Spinozistic and Schellingian way, it is always a natured nature, a product of primitive nature naturing. At base it is nature working through us. It is us. Habit is an internalized effort that is no longer effort-full, so much so that actions occur with ease allowing consciousness room to focus upon other things. Habit has the potential to develop our initial tendencies into virtues so that our behaviours and actions come naturally to us, without effort and in doing so become integrated with our own way of being. We make ourselves moral agents through repetition and practice; we become what we do. We become what we are and what we practice. This is similar to Thomas Aquinas' idea of connaturality. Connatural operation is an operation that, when unhindered and uninterrupted so that it achieves its proper object, is in accord with the nature of the agent which is acting, or of the principle which is in operation. In a closely related sense to Ravaisson, Aquinas speaks of a thing's connatural end (or connatural good). The connatural end or good is the end or good to which the thing tends in accordance with its nature - with which, in this sense, it is said to have 'a certain conformity.' Both these senses relate to the being of the individual insofar as actions, deeds, tendencies become natural to us through habituation. In other words they eventually become our own way of being, and are not opposed to or distant from our own natures. Ravasisson has within his text Of Habit, the ethical idea that habit can be cultivated into virtues; that nature is divine love and the desire for the good exists, as a final cause. Habit operates as grace, where grace is a principle of nature. It works to facilitate and ease action for the individual, moving from it's operation in the undetermined freedom of spontaneous and spiritual nature to concrete bodily action, or 'the law of the limbs'. Aquinas speaks of the divine nature of which we partake, and of a 'sympathy or connaturality for divine things' acquired through the gift of charity. Again Ravaisson has the idea of spiritual growth that can occur through action towards the good because nature is in a state of prevenient grace, a vibrant plentitude that can be drawn upon. As much a part of nature ourselves as natural products of nature we become in and through grace. We can become graceful beings, acting with ease and power. Habitual practice which may start out as a conscious decision that requires effort and determination eventually transforms into an ability that becomes second nature. A close cooperation between nature, habit  and being continually operates and they feed into one another. For both Aquinas and Ravaisson man becomes and is his action.
I will try to expand upon this comparison at a later date, as more can be said on the topic linking Aquinas and Ravaisson.