Noah Horowitz: Reality in the Name of God

Having finished reading Noah Horwitz's Reality in the Name of God I will present a few points I found interesting:
Horowitz aims to combine Badiou, Cantorian set-theory, Lacan and the computational theory of Stephen Wolfram to argue that reality is information (or bits) emerging from the universe as a supercomputer processing the divine name. For him reality is mathematizable, Kabbalistic and God's name is really nameless or cannot be said ______.
1) God is one, but not number. Rather this oneness denotes a quality, a quality of being the absolute other or transcendent, 'insisting' outside the illusory whole.
2) Badiou's thesis concerning the one confirms Horwitz's inclusion of Kabbalistic thought, namely Shvirah - the breaking of the excess of the infinite which results in fractured or broken products 'all vessels of creation and creatures are exploded by what they cannot contain - the absolute infinite as such' pg 70.
3) The zero is the mark of the empty set or void, which is the necessary nothing or non-being out of which God creates all things. This is taken from the Cantorian set of the transfinite and Badiou's unpresentable.
4) The nothingness designated by the empty set is included in all other sets, 'the void is thereby everywhere and in everything, as much as not belonging to the empty set is universal' pg 117.Other sets, numbers, entities are forms remarking zero, emptiness or void. He says the matter of numbers is zero, or we could say their essence. This theory of number gives the mystical nothingness from which everything unfolds according to Kabbalah.
5) This nothing is a metaphysical void, a real lack, which is unpresentable. God is needed to allow information and things to arise, through an act of absolute givenness or love. God withdraws from creation to allow nothingness as a point to emerge - the nothingness left by his disappearance - tzimtzum. This tzimtzum is a primordial and singular point, a pure mark, a center, nothing's nihilation, it is the Name of God which constitutes the beginning of creation. Zero is the trace or remains of the void/nothingness, or 'primordial ooze'. There is a gap in God, and him and his name are not one, as he withdraws his name or mark makes present his absence.
6) We are made in the image of God, therefore the subject is zero in a Lacanian sense (premised on desire and lack, difference within incomplete identity) as that which signifies. But the subject for Horwitz becomes the empty set itself, thereby granting importance to the subject and its own constitution of itself and reality through speaking and language. The subject is not being, but becoming and desires/lacks being.
For me this Horwitz's work has many Schellingian parallels that have the potential to be drawn out, despite him trying to offer a structural realism, rather than a speculative physical realism/naturalism.

This is what Paul. J. Ennis had to say about the book at a panel discussion entitled: 'God, Futurity, Justice' at Thinking the Absolute Conference, Liverpool.

‘Only a Digital or Temporary Messiah can save us now’

Paul J. EnnisIn his recent monograph Reality in the Name of God (2012) Noah Horwitz, building on insights from Chalmers, Tipler, and Wolfram, argues that the messiah may turn out to be nothing more than the person who builds a powerful enough computer to simulate the information that constitutes us. He speculates that in the far-flung future the resurrection of the dead will be a gift from our curious descendants.According to Horwitz’s kabbalistic reading of the world as number/naming/informatics there isnothing more to resurrection than having all our bits in order. This digital messiah shares many features with the temporary, not-quite-divine messiah of Quentin Meillassoux’s fourth world of  justice. And just like Horwitz, Meillassoux is drawn to how number and symbol allow us to speculate on futural outcomes because through them we are able to access something absolute.And it is in thinking the absolute in this way that Horwitz and Meillassoux seem, on the surface, to distinguish themselves from the weak theologians – the stated opposition of both thinkers. But as many have come to notice, the same straining for justice, the same hopefulness, and the same taste for the future is evident in both thinkers. Where they stand apart is in the trust they share concerning the force of mathematics, language, and reason to bring us outside ourselves.Philosophy in their hands is not the merging of thinking and thanking, or a guard against the pernicious effects of calculative thinking, but, rather, it is only with calculation that there is any reason to hope.